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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal, following the district court's order on intermediate appeal, from Mr.

Nathan Herren's judgment of conviction and sentence for violation of a no contact order pursuant
to I.C. § 18-920 and from the order finding him in violation of his probation and revoking his
withheld judgment based on that conviction.

B.

Factual Summary and General Course of Proceedings
For a number of years, Mr. Herren and Kip McDermott lived across the street from one

another in a subdivision. Magistrate Transcript ("Mag. Tr.") Vol. 2, p. 15, In. 18-21, p. 16, In. 26. During this period, Mr. McDermott called the police on numerous occasions to complain
about neighborhood matters including Mr. Herren parking his cars or tent trailer on the street and
Mr. Herren in turn had made complaints regarding Mr. McDermott. Jd. at p. 36, In. 20 - p. 37, In.
4; p. 77, In. 9-13; 97, In. 1-24.
Mr. Herren was charged with malicious injury to property after he cut down a portion of
Mr. McDermott's fence that he believed was in violation of an ordinance. R. 55; Mag. Tr. Vol.
2, p. 126, In. 4-25; Mag. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 9, In. 3-13; p. 19, In. 16 - p. 20, In. 3. On June 19,2008,
Mr. Herren pled guilty and was granted a withheld judgment. R. 56-57. A No Contact Order
("NCO") was entered which prohibited Mr. Herren from contacting, attempting to contact or
knowingly remaining within 100 feet of Mr. McDermott. R. 60; Trial Exhibit ("Exh.") 2; Mag.
Tr. Vol. 2, p. 16, In. 14-16. Because Mr. McDermott and Mr. Herren lived across the street from
one another and their homes were less than 100 feet apart, the standard portion of the NCO
prohibiting Mr. Herren from being within 300 yards of Mr. McDermott's property was stricken

and Mr. Herren was instead prohibited from entering Mr. McDermott's property. Mag. Tr. Vol.
2, p. 147, In. 21-23; Exh. 2.
As homeowners in the subdivision, both Mr. Herren and Mr. McDermott were members
of the homeowners association. Mag. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 12, In. 16-25; p. 123, In. 2-5. An annual
homeowners association meeting was scheduled in January 2009, the purpose of which was to
vote for new board members and address items such as the budget. ld. at p. 18, In. 11-19. Due
to Mr. Herren's ongoing issues with the homeowners association board, Mr. Herren wanted to
attend the meeting so that he could run for the board, present his side of issues and participate in
financial discussions. Id. at p. 99, In. 12-19; p. 121, In. 20-25; p. 122, In. 5-12; p. 142, In. 16-18;
p. 143, In. 5-7; p. 146, In. 6-9.
Ten days before the meeting, Mr. Herren received notice that the annual meeting would
be at the neighborhood elementary school. Id. at p. 97, In. 17 - p. 98, In. 18; p. 99, In. 23-24;
Exh. A. Mr. Herren's son attends this elementary school and Mr. Herren believed the meeting
would be held in the gymnasium, which he knew was well over 100 feet in size. ld. at p. 97, In.
17 - p. 98, In. 18; p. 122, In. 18-23; p. 136, In 11 - p. 137, In. 7; p. 152, In. 1-7. Mr. Herren thus
believed that he could attend the meeting without violating the 100 foot restriction in the NCO in
the event Mr. McDermott attended. Id.
When Mr. Herren and his son arrived for the annual meeting, he went to the gym where
previous assemblies and programs had been held but discovered that the meeting was to be held in
the library. ld. at p. 151, In. 18 - p. 152, In. 7. Mr. Herren and his son arrived in the library and
Mr. McDermott was not present. ld. at p. 30, In. 17-20. Sometime thereafter, Mr. McDermott
arrived. Immediately upon noticing Mr. McDermott, Mr. Herren and his young son moved from
2

their seats in the middle of the room to the farthest back corner while Mr. McDermott sat with
board members at the front of the r00111. Jd. at p. 21, In. 15 - p. 22, In. 6; p. 43, In. 2-6; p. 52, In.
15 - p. 53, In. 4; p. 107, In. 7- p. 108, In. 3. Mr. Herren counted ceiling tiles, which he estimated
to be three feet in length, and estimated he was at least 100 feet away from the front of the room.
Id. at p. 110, In. 19 - p. Ill, In. 12.

Mr. McDermott did not perceive that Mr. Herren was causing a problem, the two were at
opposite ends of the room from one another and seventy to eighty people were present at the
homeowners association meeting. Id. at p. 38, In. 11-15; p. 42, In. 24 - p. 43, In. 6; p. 67, In. 1314. Nevertheless, consistent with his past practice, Mr. McDermott phoned the police to complain
that Mr. Herren was violating the NCO. See id. at p. 23, In. 4-18. Upon arrival, the officer
counted cinder blocks, which he believed to each be one-foot in length, to determine that Mr.
Herren was approximately 76 feet away from Mr. McDermott. Id. at p. 69, In. 1-17. The officer
went to the backdoor by which Mr. Herren was seated and Mr. Herren went outside to speak with
him. Id. at p. 82, In. 17-19. Mr. Herren told the officer that he believed he was more than 100
feet away. Id. at p. 67, In. 19-20. The officer arrested Mr. Herren and charged him with violating
the NCO. Id. at p. 73, In. 3-21.
Following a court trial on March 10,2009, the magistrate found that Mr. Herren violated
I.C. § 18-920 because he knowingly remained within 100 feet ofMr. McDermott at the
homeowners association annual meeting. Id. at p. 174, In. 23 - p. 175, In. 3. On April 7, 2009,
the state accused Mr. Herren of violating his probation in the 2007 case by committing the new
crime of violating I.C. § 18-920. R.93-94. On April 19, 2010, Mr. Herren admitted violating the
conditions of his probation in the injury to property case by being found guilty of committing the
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new crime alleged in the NCO case. Mag. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 3, In. 19 - p. 4, In. 4.
Mr. Herren appealed to the district court challenging both his judgment of conviction for
violation of the NCO and the probation violation. R. 149-51; 491-93. The district court granted
Mr. Herren's request to consolidate the two cases on appeal. R. 163, 505. The district court
affirmed Mr. Herren's judgment of conviction and the finding that he violated his probation. R.
247-54,588-596. This appeal follows.

III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Must this Court vacate Mr. Herren's judgment of conviction for the crime of

violation of a no contact order because the magistrate did not find - and there was insufficient
evidence to support - that Mr. Herren had contact in violation of the NCO?
2.

Must the order revoking Mr. Herren's withheld judgment be reversed because the

conviction that is the basis for the probation violation is illegal?

IV. ARGUMENT
A.

Standard of Review

On review of a decision of the district court, rendered in its appellate capacity, this Court
reviews the decision of the district court directly. Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672, 183
P.3d 758, 760 (2008); State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711,184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 2008).
This Court examines the magistrate record to determine whether there is substantial and
competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and whether the magistrate's
conclusions of law follow from those findings. Jd. If those findings are so supported and the
conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, this
Court will affirm the district court's decision as a matter of procedure. Jd.
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This Court exercises free review over questions of law. Stale v. 0 'Neill, 118 Idaho 244,
245,796 P.2d 121, 122 (1990). Statutory construction is a question oflaw. Slale v. Hickman, 146
Idaho 178, 184, 191 P.3d 1098,1104 (2008); State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680,689,85 P.3d 656,
665 (2004). Courts must interpret statutes according to their plain and express meaning.
Hickman, 146 Idaho at 184, ]91 P.3dat 1104. Additionally, words of common usage must be

given their usual, plain or ordinary meaning. State v. Riley, 83 Idaho 346, 350, 362 P.2d 1075,
1077 (1961).
B.

This Court Must Vacate Mr. Herren's Judgment of Conviction Because the
Magistrate Did Not Find - and There Was Insufficient Evidence to Prove - that Mr.
Herren Had Contact in Violation of the No Contact Order

Not all violations of a no contact order constitute the criminal offense of "violation of a no
contact order" as defined in I.C. § 18-920. Instead, a person commits the offense defined in that
statute by having contact in violation of the no contact order. I.C. § 18-920(2)(c). In common
usage, "contact" involves communication or physical touching. Knowingly remaining within 100
feet of another person does not necessarily involve any communication or touching and, thus, does
not necessarily constitute a criminal offense under Section 18-920.
Here, the magistrate specifically found that Mr. Herren was guilty of violating I.C. §
18-920 because he knowingly remained within 100 feet ofMr. McDermott. The magistrate did
not find that Mr. Herren contacted Mr. McDermott within the ordinary definition of that term and
the state did not introduce substantial evidence demonstrating any such contact. Accordingly, Mr.
Herren's conviction must be vacated.
1.

Section 18-920 requires contact in violation of the NCO in order to form a
criminal violation

Section 18-920(2)(c) defines the crime of violation of a no contact order as being
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committed when "the person charged or convicted has had contact with the Stated pcrson in
violation of an order." (Emphasis added). Knowingly remaining within 100 feet of a protected
person - although generally prohibited by no contact orders - does not necessarily involve any
communication or touching and thus does not necessarily involve contact.
On appeal to the district court, the state argued that the statute "presumes that a no contact
order ... would contain the criminal prohibitions, and that the violation of that order would be the
basis for the criminal charge." R. 221-22 (Respondent's Brief, p. 5). The state's argument fails to
give effect to the statutory phrase "has had contact." Statutes must be read to give effect to every
word, clause and sentence and courts must not construe a statute in a way which makes mere
surplusage of its provisions. See Wright v. Willer, 111 Idaho 474, 7476,25 P.2d 179, 181 (1986);

see also Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 149 Idaho 107, 116,233 P.3d 38, 47 (2009) (courts
will not construe a statute in a way which makes mere surplusage of provisions included therein);

Sweitzer v. Dean, 118 Idaho 568, 571-72, 798 P.2d 27,30-31 (1990) (same); University of Utah
Hospital and Medical Center v. Bethke, 101 Idaho 245, 611 P.2d 1030 (1980) (same).
Section 18-920(2)(c) defines the crime of violation of a no contact order as being
committed when "the person charged or convicted has had contact" in violation of an order.
(Emphasis added). Had the legislature intended to criminalize all violations of a no contact order
regardless of whether the violation involved "contact," it simply would have indicated that I.C. §
18-920 is violated when the person charged or convicted violates the no contact order.
The district court found that the distance restriction in the NCO at issue here was
reasonable and could prevent an encounter that would ignite renewed hostilities. R. 251-52, 59293. Whether the provision is reasonable and enforceable is not at issue. Rather, the issue is
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whether a violation of the term constitutes a new criminal offense. Violations of a NCO that do
not involve contact can be enforced by means other than a criminal prosecution for violation of a
no contact under I.e. § 18-920, including contempt. See

I.e.

§ 18-1801(4); see also Cooper v.

Cooper, 144 P.3d 451,457 (Alaska 2006) ("an order [prohibiting being in the presence of the
protected person] may be enforceable by contempt, and possibly other means, but violation of
such an order does not amount to the crime of violating a protective order as that crime is defined
in [the pertinent statute],,).
In order to constitute a criminal violation of a no contact order, the plain language of the
statute requires that a person: 1) have contact with the protected person; and 2) that the contact be
in violation of the NCO (as opposed to contact that is enumerated as an exception to the NCO).
Accordingly, the state could not prove that Mr. Herren was guilty of a criminal offense under
Section 18-920 by simply proving that he violated a term of the NCO and, instead, was obligated
to prove that he had contact in violation of the NCO.
2.

Knowingly remaining within 100 feet of the protected person does not
necessarily involve communication or touching and thus does not necessarily
involve "contact"

Absent a specific legislative definition, courts must give the words of a statute their plain,
usual, and ordinary meaning. See e.g. State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 326, 208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009)
(courts gives the words of a statute their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning); State v. Hart, 135
Idaho 827, 829,25 P.3d 850, 852 (2001) (same); Nelson By and Through Nelson v. City of
Rupert, 128 Idaho 199, 201, 911 P.2d 1111, 1113 (1996) (courts must construe statutory terms
according to their plain, obvious, and rational meanings); Bunt v. City of Garden City, 118 Idaho
427,430,797 P.2d 135,138 (1990) (ordinary words will be given their ordinary meaning when
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construing a statute). As the term "contact" is not specifically defined for purposes of Section 18920, this Court must apply its plain, usual and ordinary meaning.
In common usage, "contacting" means physically touching or communicating. Cooper v.
Cooper, 144 P .3d 451, 457-58 (Alaska 2006) (utilizing Webster's Third New International

Dictionary definition of "contact" as setting forth common usage of the tern1 in construing
protective orders). Simply remaining within 100 feet of an individual does not necessarily involve
communication or touching and, thus, does not necessarily involve contact as the term is
employed in common usage. See Pastos v. State, 194 P.3d 387,391-92 (Alaska 2008) (where
there is no physical touching, a nonphysical contact must involve some element of direct or
indirect communication and does not merely mean coming within view); In re Ie., Dkt. No.
H035961 (2011 WL 2464718) (Cal. Ct. App. June 22,2011) (unpublished) (noting that merely
being in a person's vicinity is not a form of contact unless it is intended to convey a threat or other
message). Similarly, brief eye contact without communicative content does not amount to
"contact." Cooper, 144 P.3d at 458-59.
The district court misconstrued Mr. Herren's argument as being that "contact" requires
physical contact and then concluded that the argument was "without merit." R. 250-51, 591-92.
Mr. Herren instead argued - as he argues in this appeal - that contact requires physical touching
or communicating. See e.g. Tr. p. 12, In. 23 - p. 13, In. 9 (confirming to district court that position

was that contact involved" communicating or touching" and that "communicating can be any
range of things" a component of which can include eye contact); R. 186-87,527-28 (Appellant's
Brief, p. 6-7). Indeed, Mr. Herren even acknowledged that contact includes non verbal
communication and does not require that the parties be within one another's physical presence.
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Tr. p. 15, In. 17-20 (describing various means of non verbal communication such as emails and
third party contacts as forms of communication and thus contact); R. 235, 576 (Reply Brief, p. 5,
n.2) ("Contrary to the State's suggestion ... , Mr. Herren does not suggest that any
communication must be "verbal" to constitute contact. Obviously, non verbal communication
could amount to contact. However, brief eye contact such as occurred here involves no
communicative contact - verbal or otherwise").
Knowingly remaining within 100 feet of a protected person does not necessarily involve
contact within the ordinary meaning of the word. Accordingly, to sustain a criminal conviction
under

I.e.

§ 18-920, the state was obligated to prove that Mr. Herren had contact in violation of

the NCO and could not rely solely on a violation of the distance prohibition.
3.

The magistrate did not find that Mr. Herren contacted Mr. McDermott and
based its finding of guilt entirely on its conclusion that Mr. Herren remained
within 100 feet of Mr. McDermott

The magistrate did not find that Mr. Herren had contact with Mr. McDermott and there
was no substantial evidence to support such a finding. Indeed, in issuing findings of fact, the
magistrate explained that the "knowingly remaining within 100 feet" prohibition presented a
distinct requirement from the prohibition against contact:
There's a reason the no-contact order indicates contact versus being in the
presence or being knowingly remaining within 100 feet of an individual. It's a
protection zone, the 100 feet.
The 100 feet prevents awkwardness even if no contact were to occur at all.
That 100 feet prohibition is to prevent a victim or named protected party from
feeling pressured by being within 100 feet of the person for which they're
supposed to be protected from.
Mag. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 172, In. 1-1 0 (emphasis added). The magistrate then based its finding of guilt
on the conclusion that Mr. Herren knowingly remained within 100 feet of Mr. McDermott. Jd. at
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p. 172, In. 11 - 174, In. 24.

As the magistrate acknowledged, knowingly remaining within 100 feet of the protected
person does not always involve contact. The magistrate's finding that Mr Herren knowingly
remained within 100 feet of Mr. McDermott cannot support a finding of guilt for the criminal
offense of violating a NCO. Accordingly, Mr. Herren's judgment of conviction must be vacated.
On intermediate appeal, the state argued that it presented sufficient evidence of a violation
of I.e. § 18-920 because Mr. Herren had brief eye contact with Mr. McDermott. R. 222-23, 56364 (Respondent's Brief, p. 6-7). Initially, during trial, the state did not argue that Mr. Herren's
brief eye contact violated the no contact order and, on the contrary, argued to the magistrate that if
Mr. Herren had left the meeting after making eye contact with Mr. McDermott "we wouldn't even
be in this situation." Mag. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 166, In. 20-21. As the state acknowledged, predicating a
criminal violation ofLC. § 18-920 on the type of brief eye contact that occurred here - which was
nothing more than recognizing one another's presence - does not constitute a criminal violation of
a no contact order:
It's kind oflike somebody who - a no-contact order is in place and they go to the
grocery store ... and if they see the protected party in the grocery store ... a public
place, something that's open to the public, and they make eye contact or they see
the protected party and if that person then leaves the store, we're not going to be in
a situation where a violation of a no-contact order is about because that person
does not knowingly remain in the presence of the protected party.
Mag. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 166, In. 21 - 167, In. 7. Similarly, the magistrate based its finding of guilt on
the finding that Mr. Herren knowingly remained within 100 feet and did not find him guilty for
his brief eye contact with Mr. McDermott before Mr. Herren moved to the back of the room. Id.
at p. 172, In. 11 - 174, In. 24.
The state did not argue and the magistrate did not find that Mr. Herren violated I.C. § ] 8-
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920 by having brief eye contact with Mr. McDermott. Accordingly, even if such eye contact
could be construed as "contact" within the ordinary meaning of the term, Mr. Herren's judgment
of conviction cannot be sustained on that basis.
Additionally, no substantial evidence was introduced to support a finding of contact. It is
undisputed that as soon as Mr. Herren noticed Mr. McDermott in the room, he moved from his
seat in the middle of the library to the farthest back comer, where he was sitting quietly when a
police officer arrested him for violating the NCO. !d. at p. 21, In. 15 - p. 22, In. 6; p. 52, In. 15 p. 53, In. 4; p. 67, In. 13-14; p. 69, In. 19-23; p. 107, In. 7- p. 108, In. 3. Neither Mr. McDermott's
wife nor Mr. Herren recalled any eye contact. Id. at p. 61, In. 6-16; p. 107, In. 17-22. Mr.
McDermott testified that he had brief eye contact with Mr. Herren for about two to five seconds.

Id. at p. 33, In. 8-10. Even if the magistrate had made a factual finding as to whether eye contact
occurred (which it did not as the sole basis for the guilty finding was Mr. Herren's knowing
presence within 100 feet), the brief eye contact described by Mr. McDermott could not amount to
"contact" within the common understanding of the word. See also Cooper, 144 P.3d at 458-59.
Idaho Code Section 18-920 criminalizes contact in violation of a no-contact order. The
magistrate neither found, nor was there substantial evidence to demonstrate, that Mr. Herren
contacted Mr. McDermott. Rather, the magistrate found that Mr. Herren violated the NCO by
knowingly remaining within 100 feet of Mr. McDermott. Although arguably a violation of the
NCO's terms, knowingly remaining within 100 feet of another is not a violation of the NCO by
having contact and therefore is not a criminal violation of I.e. § 18-920.
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C.

Because the Conviction in the 2009 Case is Unlawful, the Magistrate's Order Finding
That Mr. Herren Violated His Probation and Revoking His Withheld Judgment
Must Be Vacated

A court may not revoke probation without a finding that the probationer violated the terms
of probation. State v. Rose, 144 Idaho 762, 765, 171 P.3d 253, 256 (2007); State v. Blake, l33
Idaho 237, 243, 985 P.2d 117, 123 (1999); see also I.C. §§ 19-2603,20-222. In probation
violation proceedings, the State bears the burden of providing satisfactory proof of a violation and
the court's finding of a probation violation must be on verified facts. Rose, 144 Idaho at 765, 171
P.3d at 256.
Here, the magistrate's finding that Mr. Herren violated his probation was based solely on
his admission to being found guilty of violating I.C. § 18-920. As set forth above, that finding of
guilt and the resulting conviction must be vacated. It therefore follows that the magistrate's order
finding that Mr. Herren violated his probation, therefore revoking its order withholding judgment
must similarly be vacated.
V. CONCLUSION

Mr. Herren respectfully asks that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and
sentence in the 2009 case and the magistrate's order finding him in violation of his probation and
revoking his withheld judgment in the 2007 case.
Respectfully submitted this

L

day of November, 2011.

C
Robyn Fyffe
Attorney for Nathan Herren
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